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I
I will begin by arguing that just war theory helps us understand the wrongfulness of
terrorism, and then I will do two things with this argument – first, consider the choice of
terror as a political strategy, and then worry about some of the problems of combating it.
What can go wrong in the ‘war’ against terrorism, and is just war theory equally helpful in
thinking about this ‘war’ – where the scare quotes are always necessary?
Terrorism is the random killing of innocent people, in the hope of creating pervasive fear.
The fear can serve many different political purposes, none of which, as I will argue later on,
need figure in the definition (it’s easy to imagine a terrorist organization, as it might be
portrayed by Franz Kafka, say, that has no purpose at all). Randomness and innocence are
the crucial elements in the definition. The critique of this kind of killing hangs especially on
the idea of innocence, which is borrowed from just war theory – and often misunderstood.
‘Innocence’ functions in the theory as a term of art; it describes the group of noncombatants,
civilians, men and women who are not materially engaged in the war effort. These people
are ‘innocent’ whatever their government and country are doing and whether or not they are
in favor of what is being done. The opposite of ‘innocent’ is not ‘guilty,’ but ‘engaged.’
Disengaged civilians are innocent without regard to their personal morality or politics.
But why are all civilians immune from attack, while soldiers are collectively at risk?
According to the rules of jus in bello, once the fighting has begun, it is entirely legitimate to
kill soldiers at random, as they come within range, so to speak, and it is legitimate to try to
terrorize the ones who never come within range. And yet, a lot of soldiers are not actual
combatants; they serve behind the lines; they are involved in transportation, the provision of
food, the storing of supplies; they work in offices; they rarely carry weapons. And no
soldiers are always combatants; they rest and play, eat and sleep, read newspapers, write
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they had been given a choice, they would be doing something else. How can they all be
subject to attack simply because they bear the name, and wear the uniform, of a soldier?
Why doesn’t innocence, as a term of art, describe some of them, some of the time? On the
other hand, if soldiers are rightly subject to attack, all of them, all the time, if they are
collectively at risk, then why can’t civilians, as a class, also be legitimate targets? These
civilians are members of a political community; by a clear majority, let’s say, they elected a
government that is waging an unjust war or is committed to a policy of oppression, and so
they share responsibility for immoral, possibly criminal, acts. Why aren’t the terrorists right
when they say that membership and responsibility make civilians collectively vulnerable to
attack?
I am going to take this question seriously despite my skepticism about the seriousness of
some of the people who ask it. The answer has to do with the meaning of membership in an
army and in civilian society. The army is an organized, disciplined, trained, and highly
purposeful collective, and all its members contribute to the achievement of its ends. Even
soldiers who don’t carry weapons have been taught how to use them, and they are tightly
connected, by way of the services they provide, to the actual users. It doesn’t matter
whether they are volunteers or conscripts; their individual moral preferences are not at
issue; they have been mobilized for a singular purpose, and what they do advances that
purpose. For its sake, they are isolated from the general public, housed in camps and bases,
all their needs provided for by the state. In time of war they pose a unified threat.
The society of civilians is not at all like that; civilians have many different purposes;
they have been trained in many different pursuits and professions; they participate in a
highly differentiated set of organizations and associations, whose internal discipline,
compared to that of an army, is commonly very loose. They don’t live in barracks but in
their own houses and apartments; they don’t live with other soldiers but with parents,
spouses, and children; they are not all of an age but include the very old and the very
young; they are not provided for by the government but provide for themselves and one
another. As citizens, they belong to different political parties; they have different views on
public issues; many of them take no part at all in political life; and, again, some of them are
children. Even a levee en masse cannot transform this group of people into anything like an
organized military collective.
But they are a collective of another kind: They are, together with their sons and
daughters in the army, a people. Whether their peoplehood is ethnic or national in character
or wholly political, constituted only by their citizenship, doesn’t matter here. They identify
themselves as French, or Irish, or Bulgarian; they commonly share a language and a history
and, in some prosaic sense of the term, a destiny. Their individual futures are closely linked,
and this linkage is especially tight when their country is at war; it is central to how we think
about them in wartime.
Implicit in the theory of just war is a theory of just peace: Whatever happens to these
two armies, whichever one wins or loses, whatever the nature of the battles or the extent of
the casualties, the ‘peoples’ on both sides must be accommodated at the end. The central
principle of jus in bello, that civilians can’t be targeted or deliberately killed, means that
they will be – morally speaking, they have to be – present at the conclusion. This is the
deepest meaning of noncombatant immunity: It doesn’t only protect individual non-
combatants; it also protects the group to which they belong. Just as the destruction of the
group cannot be a legitimate purpose of war, so it cannot be a legitimate practice in war.
Civilians are immune as ordinary men and women, disengaged from the business of
warfare; they are also immune as members of a human community that is not a military
organization.
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There is one partial exception to this immunity rule that also suggests its general
strength. If a country fights an unjust war, and is defeated, it can be forced to pay
reparations to its victims, and this burden will be distributed through the tax system to all its
citizens, whatever their role in the war or their views about the war. But this collective
financial burden is the only one we allow; we would not impose forced labor on the citizens
of the defeated state; and we would certainly not kill them simply because of their
citizenship. Only individuals charged with specific war crimes can be brought to trial and,
possibly, executed. All the others retain their individual and group immunities: It is both
right and good that their lives continue and that their political or national community
survives.
Terrorists attack both these immunities. They devalue not only the individuals they kill
but also the group to which the individuals belong. They signal a political intention to
destroy or remove or radically subordinate these people individually and this ‘people’
collectively. Hence, while all terrorists are murderers, all murderers are not terrorists. Most
murderers intend to kill specific people; terrorists kill at random within a specific group of
people. The message they deliver is directed at the group: We don’t want you here. We will
not accept you or make our peace with you as fellow-citizens or partners in any political
project. You are not candidates for equality or even co-existence.
This is most obviously the message of nationalist terror, aimed at a rival nation, and of
religious terror, aimed at infidels or heretics. State terror is also most often focused on a
collective that is thought to be oppositional or potentially so-sometimes an ethnic group,
sometimes a socio-economic class: The Tatars, the Kurds, the kulaks, the urban middle
class, anyone with a college education, and so on. But sometimes state agencies use random
killing, ‘disappearances,’ arrests, and torture to terrorize the whole population of their
country. Now it’s not massacre or removal that is being signaled, but tyranny, that is, radical
subordination. In fact, tyranny and terror are always closely connected. Tyrants rule by
terror, as Aristotle first pointed out. And when terrorists-out-of-power seize power, they are
likely to rule in the same way; intimidation, not deliberation, is their modus operandi.
Edmund Burke was not right about the French Revolution as a whole or about the political
doctrines that inspired it, but he was certainly right about some of the revolutionaries – the
ones who launched the Terror: “In the groves of their academy, at the end of every vista,
you see nothing but the gallows.”
But isn’t terror sometimes a more modest strategy, aimed only at changing the policy of
a government? The innocent people targeted are the people this government is supposed to
protect, and the message is that they will be at risk until the government surrenders or
withdraws or concedes some set of demands. Once that happens, the killing will stop – so
the terrorists say – and the innocent people, those of them who are still alive, won’t be
forced to abandon their homes or submit to a tyrannical regime. Consider the American use
of nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945: This was surely an act of terrorism; innocent
men and women were killed in order to spread fear across a nation and force the surrender
of its government. And this action went along with a demand for unconditional surrender,
which is one of the forms that tyranny takes in wartime. In the end, the US did not insist on
unconditional surrender, and the occupation of Japan was not a permanent subordination of
the Japanese people to American power. But this only means that the message terrorists
send is not always acted out later on. There can’t be any doubt that the destruction of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki implied, at the moment the bombs were dropped, a radical
devaluation of Japanese lives and a generalized threat to the Japanese people.
Sometimes, perhaps, terrorists do have limited purposes – though it might be better to
say that sometimes political militants with limited purposes are called terrorists but don’t
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quite fit the definition. Consider the case of the Irish Republican Army. The aim of its
members is to reunite Ulster with Eire, and they are prepared, officially at least, to accept
Ulster Protestants as a minority in a unified Ireland. Perhaps for that reason, their killings
have not been random. They have attempted to kill political leaders, punish particular
individuals for ‘collaboration’ with the British, attack buildings that symbolize the power
structure. And they have mostly given warnings in advance of their attacks, so as to allow
people to get out of the way. I don’t mean to justify IRA violence, only to suggest that if we
want to condemn it, ‘terrorism’ may not be the right word to use. It isn’t, after all, the only
negative term in our moral vocabulary.
But in all those cases where violence is random, directed against innocent men and
women, its victims have good reason to be skeptical about claims that the terrorists have
a limited agenda. From the perspective of the victims, which is morally very important,
terror is a totalizing practice. Random murder implies universal vulnerability, and the
implication is often realized in practice. Stalinist terror, to take an obvious example, was
not designed ‘to win the class struggle in the countryside’ by threatening the Kulaks; it
was designed to get rid of the Kulaks. Algerian terrorists probably intended what they
achieved – the removal of Europeans from Algerian soil (they had considerable help
from the Europeans). Palestinian terrorists have been remarkably honest about their
intentions; they don’t claim to have limited purposes, though the claim is sometimes
made on their behalf. Perhaps Basque terrorists would settle for a state of their own; they
don’t intend the destruction of Spain. But they may well intend the ethnic (and
ideological) cleansing of the Basque country. Similarly, revolutionary terrorists like the
various ‘Red Armies’ of the 1970s presumably would have stopped killing capitalists
once the capitalist system had fallen. On the other hand, they might have tried to purge
their country of its corrupt and now counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. It seems best to
take seriously the signal that terrorists send.
Of course, terrorists don’t want to be identified and judged by the signal they send but
rather by the goals they announce – not the destruction, removal, or radical subordination
of a people but rather victory in a just war, or national liberation, or the triumph of their
religion. And why shouldn’t we identify them first of all by reference to their stated ends
rather than to the means they employ? I have often heard it said that a war against terrorism
makes no sense, since terror is an instrument, not a full-scale politics like, say, communism
or Islamic radicalism. But surely one of the most important reasons (not the only one) for
opposing communism and Islamic radicalism is that these ideologies have served, in the
real world, to inspire and justify terrorism. The instruments one chooses are often morally
defining – as in the case of the members of Murder, Incorporated, say, or the Mafia, whose
long-term end, making a lot of money, is shared with many other people and entirely
acceptable in a capitalist society. No doubt, the goals of criminal gangs fail to justify the
means they choose, but, what is equally important, the goals don’t serve to identify the
actors. Members of the Mafia may think of themselves as businessmen, but we rightly call
them gangsters. Similarly, men and women who bomb urban residential areas, or organize
massacres, or make people ‘disappear,’ or blow themselves up in crowded cafes may think
of themselves as political or religious militants or as public officials and civil servants, but
we rightly call them terrorists. And we oppose them, or we should oppose them, because
they are terrorists.
If we name terrorists by their actions rather than their supposed goals, we are then free to
support the goals – if we think them just – and even actively to pursue them in non-terrorist
ways. We can support the US war effort against Japan even while we oppose the bombing
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We can work for Algerian independence even while we oppose
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FLN terrorism. We can call for Palestinian statehood, while condemning the groups that
attack Israeli civilians. A decent politics often requires a two front campaign – against
oppression and occupation, as in the last two cases, and also, simultaneously, against
murder.
I don’t believe that terrorism can ever be justified. But I also don’t want to defend an
absolute ban. “Do justice even if the heavens fall” has never seemed to me a plausible
moral position. In rare and narrowly circumscribed cases, it may be possible, not to justify,
but to find excuses for terrorism. I can imagine myself doing that in the hypothetical case of
a terrorist campaign by Jewish militants against German civilians in the 1940s – if attacks
on civilians had been likely (in fact they would have been highly unlikely) to stop the mass
murder of the Jews. The argument from extremity might work in truly extreme
circumstances, but we have to be very careful here, for terrorism, as I have been insisting,
threatens mass murder even when it doesn’t reach that far. In fact, I don’t know of any
actual terrorist campaign that can be excused in this way – despite the common claim of
desperation. The standard excuses don’t work. Actual terrorists threaten mass murder in
order to oppose or, better, with a pretense of opposing, something less. And most often they
have the totalizing intentions that their actions signal.
This is the wrong of terrorism: The murder of the innocent and the creation of a
devalued collective, a group of men and women who have been deprived of the right to life
or, alternatively, of the right to live where they are living. They have been denied what may
well be the most important of the Four Freedoms proclaimed by Roosevelt and Churchill in
1943: Freedom from fear. It is the extension of violence or the threat of violence from
individuals to groups that is the special feature of terrorism: Men and women are targeted
because of their membership – because they are Japanese, or Protestants in Northern
Ireland, or Muslims in Gujarat, or Jews in Israel. It is who you are, not what you are doing,
that makes you vulnerable; identity is liability. And that’s a connection that we are morally
bound to resist.
II
Terror is a strategy that has to be chosen from a fairly wide range of possible strategies. It is
always a choice. For many years, I have been urging that when we think about terrorism we
have to imagine a group of people sitting around a table, arguing about what ought to be
done. We don’t have minutes of those meetings, but we have descriptions of them, and we
know that they have taken place in all the cases of terrorist activity. We also know that
some people around the table have argued against the choice of terror. Terrorism is not the
general will of Irish Catholics or Algerians or Palestinians or Americans (there were leading
figures in the US government and army who opposed the use of the atomic bomb in 1945);
it isn’t the necessary product of a religious or political culture. Just as ‘Asian values,’ as
Amartya Sen has insisted, don’t mandate opposition to human rights, so Irish or Algerian or
Palestinian or American values don’t require the acceptance of terrorism. That is a decision
supported by some, opposed by others.
I suppose that the arguments are more often prudential than moral, but I don’t believe
that the people sitting around the table are ‘realists’ who simply seize political opportunities
or are driven by military necessities. That is the standard view in political science and
perhaps in politics generally, and on this view moral justification is nothing but a façade,
hastily erected after the crucial choices have been made. Sometimes, perhaps, ‘realism’ is
an accurate description of what happens in the ‘real world,’ but I want to suggest –
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provocatively, I hope, but also realistically – that sometimes just the opposite is true:
Strategic arguments about what is possible or necessary are a façade behind which militants
and officials act out their deepest political/moral convictions. Sometimes strategy is a
disguise for morality (or immorality).
Consider the British decision to bomb German cities. In the early 1940s, British
politicians and generals, sitting around a table, debated strategic bombing policy. Should
the goal of the RAF be to kill as many German civilians as possible, so as to terrorize the
enemy and shut down the economy, or should the pilots aim only at military targets? The
debate was conducted, as far as I can tell from the available memoirs and histories, entirely
in the language of strategy; the principle of noncombatant immunity was never mentioned.
What were the probabilities of hitting military targets, given the navigational and aiming
devices then available? What losses would the air force suffer if it flew by day so as to aim
(a little) more precisely? What were the likely effects of bombing urban residential areas on
civilian morale and then on the production and delivery of military supplies? Outside the
government, a few people raised moral questions about bombing policy; inside, it was as if
there was a ban on moral talk: There’s no-one here but us realists! But if you look at the
years after the war, it turns out that the people who favored bombing residential areas in,
say, 1943 were, later on, advisors and office-holders in Tory governments where they
continued to defend tough and ‘realistic’ decision-making, and the people who opposed it
were on the left, working for Labor governments or the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament and, often, making the moral arguments they didn’t make during the war.
Surely their strategic arguments in1943 were driven in part by their repressed political/
moral convictions – not only by their views on the ‘necessity’ of killing civilians, but also
by their views on the rightness or wrongness of such killing. After all, strategists commonly
work from inadequate and uncertain information; their predictions are cast in very rough
probabilities; they can easily go either way, and they seem to go, or often to go, the way the
people making them (or the people for whom they are made) want them to go.
So, when terrorists tell us that they had no choice, there was nothing else to do, terror
was their last resort, we have to remind ourselves that there were people around the table
arguing against each of those propositions. And we also have to recognize that strategic
considerations are not the sole, possibly not the most important, factor shaping these
arguments. The overall politics and morality, the worldview, of the participants is also a
factor. They are in fact answering questions like these: Do they acknowledge the human
value of their enemies? Are they prepared for a compromise peace? Can they imagine a
future state in which they share power but do not rule? This is what is actually at stake
around the table, and we can see the wrong of terrorism reiterated in the negative answers
that come from its advocates.
III
Once the decision is made, and terrorists are doing their work, how should we fight against
them? I am going to assume the value of doing that, and I am not going to consider here
efforts to do something else under cover of the ‘war’ against terrorism (like fight a war in
Iraq). There isn’t any worthy political cause that can’t be exploited for unworthy and
unrelated purposes, but my subject here is the cause, not the exploitation. I am also not
going to try to describe the necessary political response to terror. I take it for granted that a
political response is necessary, but ‘fighting’ is also necessary. The first answer to the
question about how to fight is simple in principle, though often difficult in practice: Not
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terroristically. That means, without targeting innocent men and women. I will focus on that
principle, which derives from the theory of just war – though the ‘war’ against terrorism is
closer, as we will see, to police work than to actual combat. And so there is a second answer
to the question about how to fight: Just as the police are supposed to do, we must operate
within the constraints of constitutional democracy. But constitutionalism, like politics more
generally, is a subject for another occasion.
In order to fight, you have to identify the enemy, so it is very important to say at the
outset that the people the terrorists claim to represent are not themselves complicit in the
terror. Whatever their emotional connection or disconnection (and we know that they are
often strongly connected), they are not material supporters; they fit my description of the
civilian collective. The terrorists do have material support, but their supporters are par-
ticular men and women, not the people generally. At the end of the ‘war’ against terrorism,
as at the end of any other war, the people generally will have to be accommodated. The
terrorists collectivize the guilt of the other side, insisting that every single person is im-
plicated in the war or the oppression. The anti-terrorists must collectivize in the opposite
way, insisting on the innocence of the people generally. Like the police, again, they have to
look for the particular individuals who are planning, providing material support for, or
actually carrying out terrorist operations. That search is more difficult than the search for
legitimate targets in ‘ordinary’ warfare. There are indeed terrorist organizations, which
sometimes look like criminal gangs, sometimes like enemy armies, but are probably best
thought of as different from both of these. In any case, however they identify themselves,
they are not the same as ‘the people.’
It is a moral and political mistake, then, to engage in collective punishments –
destroying the family home where a suicide bomber lived, for example, as the Israelis have
done, on the assumption that the family supported the bomber or could have prevented the
bombing. That might sometimes be true, but it is often untrue (despite the statements family
members are forced to issue after the event). In domestic society, the police are not allowed
to act like that, demolishing the homes of Mafia relatives, say, because they live off the
family business; nor should armies or ‘special forces’ be allowed to do that either. If a
particular relative is complicit in the crime, then the anti-terrorists have to find some way to
apprehend and punish that person – not the family, the village, or the urban neighborhood.
Collective punishment treats people as enemies who may be as different from one another
(in their politics, for example) as were the people in the café or on the bus that the suicide
bomber attacked. And it is to the advantage of the anti-terrorists that those (political)
differences be brought into the open, not suppressed.
The terrorists hold that there is no such thing as ‘collateral’ or, as the dictionary says,
secondary damage. All damage for them is primary, and they want to do as much damage
as they can: The more deaths, the more fear. So anti-terrorists have to distinguish
themselves by insisting on the category of collateral damage, and by doing as little of it as
they can. The same rules of jus in bello apply to the ‘war’ against terrorism as to war in
general: Soldiers must aim only at military targets and they must minimize the harm they
do to civilians. I don’t believe that the doctrine of ‘double effect,’ as it is usually
understood, adequately describes what is required here. It isn’t enough that the first effect,
the damage to military targets, is intended and the second one, the harm to civilians, is
unintended. The two effects require two intentions: First, that the damage be done and,
second, that the harm be avoided. What justice demands is that the army take positive
measures, accept risks to its own soldiers, in order to avoid harm to civilians. The same
requirement holds for anti-terrorists – holds more strongly, I think, insofar as it is mostly
police rather than soldiers who are at work in this ‘war’ (or, the soldiers are doing police
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work), and we impose much higher standards of care for civilians on the police than we do
on armies in combat.
This need for care also governs the practice that has come to be called ‘targeted killing.’
It is the Israelis who made this practice famous, but I am going to look at an American
example. First, though, a general word. The killing of the political leaders of the enemy
state is ruled out by just war theory, as it is by international law, because of the assumption
that the war will end, and should end, with a peace agreement negotiated with those same
leaders, who are taken to be representative figures. Not many people would have opposed
the assassination of Adolph Hitler, but that was (in part) because we had no intention of
negotiating with him. But this argument applies only to political leaders, the heads of the
civilian collective; it doesn’t apply at all to army officers, who are part of a military
collective.
We should probably try to make this same distinction with regard to terrorist
organizations, even when it is blurred or non-existent in fact. In Ireland, the political
party, Sinn Fein, managed to separate itself from the IRA – an ‘army’ whose members
(whether terrorists or not) were vulnerable to arrest or attack in a way that the politicians
were not. If the separation was a pretense, as the British claimed for a long time, it was a
useful pretense, as they acknowledged in the end when they negotiated with the leaders of
Sinn Fein – who were by then in a tense relationship with IRA militants. It is harder to
figure out how to deal with organizations that hardly bother to pretend that they have
separate political and military ‘arms,’ like Hamas in Palestine, where the claim to separation
is made only after an Israeli attack and then forgotten. Still, it might be prudent to support
the pretense in the hope that it will one day take on some reality and open a path to
negotiation. But this is prudence, it seems to me, not a moral requirement (except insofar as
political leaders ought to be prudent). In any case, the vulnerability of military leaders is
clear. If a couple of British commandos in World War II had crossed German lines in North
Africa (or if a couple of German commandos had crossed British lines), made their way to
army headquarters, and killed a colonel, a brilliant tactician, who was planning, but wasn’t
going to be engaged in, the next tank attack, that would have been a ‘targeted killing,’ but
not a wrongful assassination.
Now consider the case of the five Al Qaeda militants (so they were described by US
officials) traveling in a van in the Yemini desert, who were killed by a Hellfire missile late
in 2001. Had the same attack taken place in Afghanistan, it would have been an act of war.
Assuming that the people killed were correctly identified, we would not have thought the
attack wrong or even problematic. It is part of the awfulness of war that people actively
engaged on the other side can legitimately be killed without warning. Sometimes it is
possible to offer them a chance to surrender but often, in night raids, ambushes, and air
attacks, for example, it isn’t possible.
Now imagine that the same Hellfire attack on the same people in the same van had taken
place not in Afghanistan but on a street in Philadelphia. It would not be an act of war, and it
would not be legitimate. We would be horrified; the attack would be a political crime, and
we would look for the officials responsible. In Philadelphia, the (suspected) terrorists would
have to be arrested, arraigned, provided with lawyers, and brought to trial. They could not
be killed unless they were convicted – and many Americans, opposed to capital punish-
ment, would say: Not even then.
Yemen is somewhere between Afghanistan and Philadelphia. It isn’t a war zone, but it
also isn’t a zone of peace – and this description will fit many, not all, of the ‘battlefields’ of
the ‘war’ against terrorism. In large sections of Yemen, the government’s writ doesn’t run;
there are no police who could make the arrests (14 soldiers had already been killed in
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attempts to capture the Al Qaeda militants) and no courts in which prisoners could expect a
fair trial. The Yemini desert is a lawless land, and lawlessness provides a refuge for the
political criminals called terrorists. The best way to deal with the refuge would be to help
the Yemini government extend its authority over the whole of its territory. But that is a long
process, and the urgencies of the ‘war’ against terrorism may require more immediate
action. When that is true, if it is true, it doesn’t seem morally wrong to target Al Qaeda
militants directly – for capture, if that’s possible, but also for death. Yemen in this regard is
closer to Afghanistan than to Philadelphia.
But there are two moral/political limits on policies of this sort, and the limits are
critically important because governments, once they learn to kill, are likely to kill too much
and too often. The first limit is implied by the word ‘targeted.’ We have to be as sure as we
can be, without judge or jury, that the people we are aiming at are really Al Qaeda militants
or, more generally, that they are engaged in planning and carrying out terrorist attacks.
Targets have to be identified, and the work of identification must be careful and precise.
The second limit is even more important. We have to be as sure as we can be that we are
able to hit the targeted person without killing innocent people in his (or her) vicinity. Here I
think that we have to adopt standards that are closer to Philadelphia than to Afghanistan. In
a war zone, collateral damage cannot be avoided; it can only be minimized. The hard
question in war is what degree of risk we are willing to accept for our own soldiers in order
to reduce the risks we impose on enemy civilians. But when the police are chasing
criminals in a zone of peace, we rightly give them no latitude for collateral damage. In the
strongest sense, they must intend not to injure civilians – even if that makes their operation
more difficult and even if the criminals get away.
That seems to me roughly the right rule for people planning targeted killings. Like the
police, they are not actually engaged in a battle; they plan their attack in advance and they
can call it off if they discover, say, that their target is holding a child on his lap (as in Albert
Camus’s play ‘The Just Assassins’), or has moved into a crowd, or is sitting in an apartment
that isn’t empty – as it was expected to be. They can’t avoid imposing some degree of risk
on innocent people, and the risks will certainly be greater than those imposed by police in a
city at peace, but we must insist on a strenuous effort to minimize the risks. The American
attack in the Yemini desert may have met this standard; I don’t know enough about the
people killed, or about other people in the vicinity, or about the tactical choices that had to
be made, to arrive at a firm judgment. Some of Israel’s targeted killings have met the
standard; some almost certainly have not. A car on a busy street is not a permissible target –
no more than a single table in a crowded café would be. If terrorists use other people as
shields, then anti-terrorists have to find their way around the shields, just as we would want
the police to do. The case of the one ton bomb dropped on an apartment house in Gaza,
where the target was one person but almost 20 were killed, is a paradigmatic example of
what should not be done. I don’t think that it could be justified even by wartime rules of
‘taking aim.’ But maybe this attack was not a case of ‘targeted’ killing; reading newspaper
accounts, it is difficult to avoid the sense that its intent was to terrorize a civilian population
whose members were taken, collectively, to be supporters of terrorism.
When killing takes precedence over targeting, the anti-terrorists look too much like the
terrorists, and the moral distinction that justifies their ‘war’ is called into question. The
same thing happens in domestic society when the line between police and criminals is
blurred by the brutality or corruption of the police. But it is important to stress that when
that happens, we defend the line as best we can by criticizing and reforming the police; we
don’t join the criminals. Similarly, whatever goes wrong in the ‘war’ against terrorism
doesn’t affect the wrongness of terror. In fact, it confirms the wrongness: What we learn is
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that we have to condemn the murder of innocent people wherever it occurs, on both sides of
the line.
This condemnation works best, it seems to me, if we start from just war theory with its
recognition of non-combatant immunity. But as the last part of this essay should have made
clear, we can’t stop with just war theory. We need to maneuver between our conception of
combat and our conception of police work, between international conflict and domestic
crime, between the zones of war and peace. Jus in bello represents an adaptation of morality
to the circumstances of combat, to the heat of battle. We may need further adaptations, to the
circumstances of terror. But we can still be guided, even in these new circumstances, by our
fundamental understanding of when fighting and killing are just and when they are unjust.
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